4 Years In, Russia into Ukraine – February 26, 2026 (Deconstruction Series)

Okay, a bit misleading I agree. It was really 12 years ago that Russia “annexed” Crimea with subsequent outbreaks of fighting between those loyal to Ukraine against those loyal to Russia.

We can argue all day long about the so called Revolution of Dignity, or Euromaidan Revolution as others call it, but arguably in the end what we are talking about is a stance of Ukraine as a nation headed more towards the west or more aligned to the Russian side of the fence. Much conversation, and historical implications resulting from, on the concept of Ukraine being aligned to the EU, or NATO, or further west into the hands of US influence.

For the purposes of this conversation, Russia’s more full scale invasion of Ukraine started just over 4 years ago on February 24, 2022 and with all the recent events in this nation, from largely the Trump Administration, most of mainstream media slept through the anniversary.

A natural question, why did Putin decide on a full scale invasion of Ukraine?

Like so many of our conversations, the answer depends on who you ask but to deconstruct this we should consider trains of thought that are both uncomfortable and probably inconvenient for the west.

One area to consider, as a start to answer this question, gives us the potential to relitigate all that happened towards the end of the Cold War with the fall of the old Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR.) One could argue, very well, that how the old Soviet Union functioned economically and politically ended up collapsing under its own weight, ironically failing in a way the underlying Marxist ideologies claimed would happen to the west. But one potential point being that because of that failure, the majority of nations more aligned to the old Soviet Union began to reexamine what their post-Cold War nations may be like.

Without getting to far into the weeds, in the USSRs final months plenty of “deals” were struck with the west on what the US and NATO would and would not do. This was robust all things considered and included INF, Chemical Weapons Accord, and the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START.)

But buried in all the back and forth was what would become a very controversial statement and even more controversial opinions about it. Opinions vary on exactly what was said but the going narrative is in February 1990 then US Secretary of State James Baker told Mikhail Gorbachev that if the Soviet Union allowed for a unified Germany and to remain in NATO that there would be “no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction or forces one inch to the east.”

Where this becomes awkward is that statement appears in no formal written treaty or agreement on the future of NATO. A rising from the ashes Russia took the opinion that it was a “binding promise” while the US and NATO took the position of “context” on application to a unified NATO aligned Germany (as in German borders.)

Question – Why is all this important?

The context of how all that happened created attitudes, in what would become Russia, about what would happen to their nation still adversarial to all things west. And that included Vladimir Putin, at the time of the collapse a 16 year foreign intelligence officer for the KGB. Before heading off to a political career starting in Saint Petersburg, he retired a lieutenant colonel and by some accounts his time with the KGB was like many others focused on Europe and NATO.

Keep that part in mind for a bit here.

Something to ponder. In conditions like the collapse of the old USSR, there is usually strong potential for an ideology or two to rise and form what comes next for a new nation of people that saw the old. Consider post WWI Germany into what became WWII Germany, and even consider a conquered Japan from WWII become an eventual economic and trade powerhouse into the 1980s and 1990s. A conquered, or failed, nation does not mean ideologies are always discarded. Perhaps shifted, consideration given to what did not work and what the future could hold.

Putin and what became his rise to seemingly unchecked and unending complete power over Russia is not all that different, and what came with that was consistent distrust and adversarial intentions for all things west.

Question – Is NATO the wedge?

Despite eastern and western characterizations of all deals, written down to implied, at the end of the old Cold War it is not unreasonable to at least consider NATO’s further expansion east as at least one reason for Putin to weaponized. It is the difference between agreeing with Putin, against simply recognizing that the idea is there all in a manner that deconstructs popular narrative that is usually governed by the “winner” in these sorts of things. Does not mean the loser is going to concede every thought and conclusion.

So, victory in the cold war has consequences and potentially so does the attitudes ana actions of the winning side. Again, not about agreeing with sides but recognizing both history and people.

This may mean a few things.

This is not necessarily about conceding that West and NATO is in part responsible for Russia invading Ukraine, but may be more about how the West and NATO decided to go about doing this, whom was left in charge of these nations to align west, and ultimately a question on the power of that governance.

Since disarmament was in the mix, what was not in the mix was how the west went in to stabilize nations most susceptible to new Russian influences. If you are following this train of thought, it implies that NATO became less about a defense agreement and more about a political exercise in dealing with agenda and location.

Then there was a sudden split, a change of US intentions especially, to focus away from Europe and Asia and look to the Middle East. Europe was disarming, new alliances based on economy and trade was being formed, and NATO started to advance east not by tanks and military presence as much as the politics of being a NATO member.

At that point the US especially was already neck deep in the global war on terror after the 9/11 attacks. Trillions of dollars being spent in two regards.

One, going into Afghanistan and going back into Iraq. Bush 41 protecting Kuwait from Saddam, then Bush 43 deciding Afghanistan and Iraq could be fought at the same time ultimately making way for the largest 2 military campaigns in US history.

Two, going with “pro-democracy” nation building projects across many nations inching ever closer to Russia with questionable prospects for success.

What was not being considered is how Russia looked at all of this, in the hands of a KGB trained anti-all things Europe foreign intelligence officer. This may be less about NATO and anti-Russian agendas but more about a perception of weakness and Putin considering US attentions were elsewhere.

Technically, the response from the west was not very strong more or less staying still political with Putin using military and intelligence assets in Georgia in 2008, Putin helping pro-Russian groups in Ukraine in 2014 eventually taking Crimea, Putin deciding to directly assist in Syria in 2015 on, and finally in 2022 Putin deciding on a full-scale invasion of Ukraine that became a US internal political talking point between Trump and Biden instead of any sort of direct action.

Consider, that in all of this back and forth for the US in dealing with arguably the greater Middle East region (part of North Africa all the way to Pakistan were Osama bin Laden was found in 2011) what was not happening was the US or NATO really thinking about Putin & Russian strategy.

Who is being honest about all this?

Sadly, doubtful anyone is.

That includes mainstream media, and Democrats & Republicans.

Before Russia launched their full scale invasion of Ukraine it turns out there was plenty of talk on how long it would take Russia win. Couple days, roughly 2 weeks, there was plenty of commentary from “experts” on CNN, to Putin aligned Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, to captured Russian military documents suggesting this would be a matter of days.

Here we are 4 years later.

Putin errors notwithstanding, especially underestimating an energetic and determined Ukraine to defend themselves as well as US and now more Europe dumping weapons and supplies into Ukraine, we have another arguable multiple-level blunder. For Putin, this has become an economic and costly mess. For the west, this has become a US and European nation division moment. You could argue NATO still appears weak even though Ukraine is not a NATO member, and likely never can be now.

If the US and NATO is partly responsible for this mess, the history books may credit how the west looked at this area of the world while being so busy elsewhere. But, Russia and Putin will also have a paragraph or two on the total failure to achieve their own objectives seemingly thinking they could capitalize on west arrogance. Across the board, the very basics of power politics and perception of strength seems completely missed by everyone. Putin, Biden & Trump, most of NATO, most European nation leaders, and plenty of mainstream media again sleeping at the wheel not talking about any of this.

Tough question – Is “international order” ever achieved with rules and agreements?

The answer appears to be, hell no.

Assuming for a moment, that Ukraine ever concludes with some sort of agreement, that in anyway looks like where the current stalemate battlelines look to be, then the west will hand Putin and Russia a costly but major win from the perspective of what the end of the Cold War handed to the west in that win. That should answer a few questions on why Trump appears aligned to Putin over Europe, Trump has far more interest in all things oil and rare earth minerals to be bothered with one of the most consequential conclusions from the 20th Century.

Because we can conclude that Putin will not think in terms the west does, anything less of kicking Russia out of Ukraine will give a perception that Russia can push a sphere of power into critical nations between NATO and Russia but also further south into the very Middle East the US is politically, and occasionally operationally if not direct militarily, entrenched in.

Let me say this a crude but direct way, no one gives a shit about a “red line” absent any kind of threat of force someone more eastern will respect. The consideration is that not everyone looks at diplomacy with the same lens, not everyone considers leadership with agreed required attributes.

Another tough one – Did Europe cause any of this?

Kind of, maybe…

Austria and especially Germany benefitted from the Nord Stream energy deals, some of that engagement direct bypassing the EU, NATO, and the US. That was structural and you could say entrenched Russia into middle Europe.

All things considered, all eyes are on Ukraine for a targeted attack on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipeline systems in September 2022, resulting in the destruction of three out of the four total individual pipes. Putin blames the US and UK, does not really matter but that was a showing of power getting Putin’s attention.

The good news is Europe continues to try to support Ukraine even with the Trump Administration seemingly back and forth on the matter, some days yes some days not so much when it comes to showing of support that has emphasis on the very power it takes to be respected. Not in our political context of all things Democrats and Republicans going at each other, but respect someone like Putin may consider.

What is the future for Ukraine?

One school of thought to give real weight is the idea of eventually the stalemate resulting in some “deal” made. Russia and their revisionist attitudes when it comes to protection policy will look for certain conditions, Ukraine wants their nation back, and odds are neither side will get their way entirely.

Which is sad in that no matter the deal, no matter the conclusion outside of Russia entirely out of Ukraine and perhaps Crimea too, Russia will still score a critical regional civilizational victory with roots going back it’s “quasi-state” under the old USSR. The era of half the nation spying on the other half, the era of anti-all things west and anti-democracy.

The questions will be the economics, trade capabilities, and even defense for whatever Ukraine looks like after all is said and done.

Rebuilding and supporting those efforts is one thing, who shows the level of political and military prowess projecting Putin respecting strength is another. A little bit more than something Pete Hegseth would say headed into our out of a bar somewhere, on or off of a stage of supporting Republicans, it has to be a method and mentality someone like Putin would respect. Deconstruct the difference as this something entirely absent from the discussions on “strength through peace” between Republicans and Democrats, lined up political commentary left to right mainstream media to support.

So, 4 years in, arguably 12, more like over 34 years ago.

Just like some rightfully criticize various US Presidents for not learning much about who all we fight or why we do so across the greater Middle East region, we may ask ourselves if any President from Bush 41 forward including both Biden or Trump bothered to learn much about what Putin and Russia became? Those ideologies, how they view the west, how they interpret strength, even their own intentions to literally rewrite what happened way back towards the end of 1991.

Not about respect for who was right or wrong, too simplistic, more like dealing with people who do not and will not align to western views of a “world order” or what it means to be in some level of agreement with another nation.

In the balance is we might, depending on source, be well into the 7th digit in total casualties, killed & wounded, Russian and Ukrainian. One may argue the people, economies down to families, are getting the bill for this.

This may not be much of a tactic outlined in “The Art of the Deal” but a reality that so few seem to be able to deal with a Cold War era relic that might redefine politics and civilization in eastern Europe. At a minimum. With a nation that still sits on the UN Security Council, with plenty of nuclear capabilities, and expanding influences including alignments with an economic powerhouse in China.

Consider all these things, especially when listening to the typical lot Republican to Democrat and across mainstream media commentary, in the context of what it takes to end a mess that arguably we are partially responsible for ensuring happened by dealing with people so few are interested in understanding.

We are too into this to expect it to just go away quietly even if mainstream media is acting the part.

So far, those battleline stalemates are possibly becoming political as well. And the likely reason is understanding, all directions.